The Mind beyond the Head: Two Arguments in Favour of Embedded Cognition

  • Andrea Roselli Leverhulme Trust Post Doctoral Research Fellow in Philosophy, Durham University
Keywords: Extended Cognition, Mind, anti–Cartesianism, Situated Cognition, Embedded Cognition


In this paper I defend situated approaches of cognition, and the idea that mind, body and external world are inseparable. In the first section, I present some anti–Cartesian approaches of cognition and discuss the intuition they share that there is a constitutive interaction between mind, body and external environment. In the second section, I present the fallacy of the Cartesian theater of the mind and explain its theoretical premises. In the third section, I present a spatial argument against it, and argue that some case studies could give support to the idea of the mind stretching over the boundaries of the skull. In the fourth section, I present a temporal argument, and argue that even in this case the idea of an interaction between our cognitive life and the external world has at least a very strong intuitive palatability.


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