Filozofija i društvo / Philosophy and Society <p>&nbsp;<em>Filozofija i društvo </em>/ <em>Philosophy and Society</em> is a peer reviewed, open access academic journal established in 1987 and published&nbsp;quarterly by the <a href="" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory</a>, University of Belgrade. The journal was founded by members of the Belgrade ‘Praxis School’. The journal strives to cover and present key tendencies of contemporary theory and, at the same time, to encourage research in studies of philosophy and the humanities. It promotes innovative and critical thinking, open and constructive debate, creating in this way a clear space for an ongoing dialogue about questions of intellectual and social reality within the international academic community.&nbsp;<em>Contributions of high quality</em> – regardless of their tradition, school of thought or disciplinary background – are welcome. The journal covers a wide breadth of philosophical and social questions that are theoretically orientated. In accordance with this, the editorial board equally values disciplinary and interdisciplinary oriented studies.</p> <p>The highest quality of editorial standard is ensured by the international membership and disciplinary expertise of the editorial board.</p> Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, University of Belgrade, Serbia en-US Filozofija i društvo / Philosophy and Society 0353-5738 <p>Articles published in the&nbsp;<em>Philosophy and Society</em>&nbsp;will be Open-Access articles distributed under a&nbsp;<a href="" target="_blank">CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 License</a>.</p> Deliberative Epistemic Instrumentalism, or Something Near Enough <p>In her book <em>Democracy and Truth: The Conflict between Political and Epistemic Virtues</em>, Snježana Prijić Samaržija advocates a stance that not only political, but also epistemic values are necessary for justification of democracy. Specifically, she mounts defense for one particular type of public deliberation on epistemic grounds. In this paper, I will discuss the following issue: What connects this type of public deliberation to the wider context of (epistemic) justification of democracy? I will attempt to explain why Prijić Samaržija’s stance can be understood as a version of deliberative epistemic instrumentalism and to discuss the role played by the public deliberation within this framework.</p> Ivan Mladenović ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2020-03-27 2020-03-27 31 1 3 11 10.2298/FID2001003M Public Reason and Reliability Democracy <p>The article starts with a sketch of Prijić Samaržija’s hybrid theory. After that, it provides an overview of the virtue epistemology theory, to which she attributes a relevant influence on her own position, as well as that of reliability democracy which constitutes her view about democratic legitimacy. Secondly, her proposal is discussed and confronted with a slightly amended version of the leading liberal democratic theory of democratic legitimacy, formulated and defended by John Rawls.</p> Elvio Baccarini ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2020-03-27 2020-03-27 31 1 12 23 10.2298/FID2001012B Biological Citizenship in the Reliability Democracy <p>In this paper, I shall present the theoretical view on the reliability democracy as presented in Prijić Samaržija’s book <em>Democracy and Truth </em>(2018), and examine its validity through the case of the division of epistemic labour in the process of deliberation on autism treatment policies. It may appear that because of their strong demands, namely, the demand for rejection of medical authority and for exclusive expertise on autism, autistic individuals gathered around the neurodiversity movement present a threat to the reliability democracy.</p> Kristina Lekić Barunčić ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2020-03-27 2020-03-27 31 1 24 36 10.2298/FID2001024L Epistemic Feature of Democracy: the Role of Expert in Democratic Decision Making <p>In her book <em>Democracy and Truth: The Conflict between Political and Epistemic Virtues</em>, Snježana Prijić Samaržija advocates that a purely procedural justification which defines the authority and legitimacy of democracy only in relation to the fairness of the procedure itself is not enough for a full justification of democracy. Some epistemic values should also be included. This epistemic quality of democracy depends on the quality of the decisions that the democratic procedures produce. In that sense, the author is advocating a hybrid theory that secures harmony between political and epistemic values, favoring deliberative procedure for this purpose, and thus promotes equal respect for both democratic values. In doing so, she is advocating the specific type of division of epistemic labor that I will attempt to critically re-examine here, as well as to bring into question the privileged role of the experts in democratic decision-making.</p> Ivana Janković ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2020-03-28 2020-03-28 31 1 37 42 10.2298/FID2001037J Social Epistemic Inequalities, Redundancy and Epistemic Reliability in Governance <p class="Default"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; color: #221e1f;">In this paper I argue that social epistemic inequalities, exemplified by expert structures and their introduction into various social and political processes, may be a collective epistemic virtue only if they are discovered under the conditions of free possibility of redundant disagreement. In the first part of the paper, following Snježana Prijić Samaržija’s work in <em>Democracy and Truth</em>, I explicate the epistemic value of social epistemic inequalities, and address the epistemic defectiveness of both the complete social disregard for any expertize (flat epistemology) and the rule of experts. In the second part of the paper, I argue that social epistemic inequalities governing a large and complex population of epistemically suboptimal agents may be a collective epistemic virtue, reflective of discovery of epistemically reliable processes, if they can be contested and, in principle, withstand redundant disagreement.</span></p> Marko-Luka Zubčić ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2020-03-28 2020-03-28 31 1 43 55 10.2298/FID2001043Z The Epistemology of Democracy: the Epistemic Virtues of Democracy <p class="Default" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; color: #221e1f;">The new and vibrant field of the epistemology of democracy, or the inquiry about the epistemic justification of democracy as a social system of procedures, institutions, and practices, as a cross-disciplinary endeavour, necessarily encounters both epistemologists and political philosophers. Despite possible complaints that this kind of discussion is either insufficiently epistemological or insufficiently political, my approach explicitly aims to harmonize the political and epistemic justification of democracy. In this article, I tackle some fundamental issues concerning the nature of the epistemic justification of democracy and the best theoretical framework for harmonizing political and epistemic values. I also inquire whether the proposed division of epistemic labour and the inclusion of experts can indeed improve the epistemic quality of decision-making without jeopardizing political justification. More specifically, I argue in favour of three theses. First, not only democratic procedures but also the outcomes of democracy, as a social system, need to be epistemically virtuous. Second, democracy’s epistemic virtues are more than just a tool for achieving political goals. Third, an appropriate division of epistemic labour has to overcome the limitations of both individual and collective intelligence.</span></p> Snježana Prijić Samaržija ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2020-03-28 2020-03-28 31 1 56 70 10.2298/FID2001056P Justification of Atemporal Values in Alexius Meinong’s Theory of Objects <p class="Default" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; color: #221e1f;">In the history of philosophy, Alexius Meinong’s interest in axiology has traditionally been seen as confined to his earlier works. However, if we analyze his writing after 1917, in which Meinong discusses timeless values, it becomes clear that he became increasingly disinterested in psychology. Moreover, since the theory of the object, in Meinong’s view, could not be a part of metaphysics, he had to deal with the additional methodological difficulty of proving that the good exists independently of human subjectivity. The article discusses A. Meinong’s understanding of the object of desire, the object of a value-feeling and the connection between ethical values as objects of consciousness and time. It is shown that, according to Meinong, language is where values actually reside and only through language can their reality be explained.</span></p> Ekaterina Cherepanova ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2020-03-28 2020-03-28 31 1 73 83 10.2298/FID2001073C Ius sive Potentia: Paul and Spinoza <p class="Default" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; color: #221e1f;">This article is a part of a research project entitled <em>Law as Potency</em>, that, broadly put, investigates the relation between law and ontology. I argue, starting from St. Paul, that an ontological perspective can be understood as the possibility of justice, in a sense of a liberation of the human being. Thus, this paper offers an analysis of the concepts of potency and universality. Even though the term ‘universalism’ is not explicitly mentioned, it is present in St. Paul’s thinking and brought onto its practical consequences. In addition, Spinoza’s reading of St. Paul opens up a possibility to challenge this concept to a concept of modern teleology. Therefore, I discuss the consequences of this confrontation in regard to law, politics and economics. This leads to an articulation of another modernity, where, perhaps, the universal appears as the affirmation of difference.</span></p> Miroslav Milović ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2020-03-28 2020-03-28 31 1 84 97 10.2298/FID2001084M The Erotic/Aesthetic Quality Seen from the Perspective of Levinas’s Ethical An-archaeology <p class="Default"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; color: #221e1f;">This paper emphasizes the place and the role of the aesthetic quality and the role of the erotic in Levinas’s project that deals with ethical an-archaeology. Despite Levinas’s categorical statements that there are irreconcilable differences between ethics and aesthetics, i.e. between ethics and the erotic, above all, it is emphasized here that these differences do not represent a stark or sharp contrast, but quite contrary, they often constitute a subversive ontological element. On the other hand, somewhat unexpectedly, with its ethical anti-aestheticism Levinas’s “noncontemporary” thought appears to be, at the same time, both significant and critical, elementary, emancipatory and contemporary in relation to present-day reactionary reactualization and revitalization of the aesthetic quality which mechanically proceeds to develop on the margins of Levinas’s emancipatory past.</span></p> Srđan Maraš ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2020-03-28 2020-03-28 31 1 98 107 10.2298/FID2001098M Philosophical Implications of Morris’ Semiotic Theory <p class="Default"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; color: #221e1f;">The subject of this paper is Charles Morris’ semiotic theory that has as one of its major projects the unification of all sciences of signs. However, since the above project has proven to be unsuccessful, we will try to examine here the reasons that led to this. Accordingly, we will argue that to transcend the particularities of individual disciplines that he wanted to unify, Morris had to make certain ontological assumptions, instead of theoretical and methodological ones, that they could share. However, because the ‘sign’ as an ontological category could in our view only be established if we follow the principles of the pragmatic philosophical tradition, we will try to show that the reasons for this failure should be primarily sought in different effects that consistent application of the pragmatic principles has in each of them (primarily in linguistics and the philosophy of language). On the other hand, this should enable us to draw several important conclusions regarding Morris’ project: namely, that his failure does not have to mean giving up semiotics as a potentially key discipline in approaching some fundamental philosophical problems, but also that it would demand return to the original semiotics developed in Peirce’s works.</span></p> Miloš Bogdanović ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2020-03-28 2020-03-28 31 1 108 125 10.2298/FID2001108B FROM THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INSTITUTE <p>FROM THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INSTITUTE</p> <p>Olga Nikolić i Igor Cvejić</p> Olga Nikolić i Igor Cvejić ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2020-03-28 2020-03-28 31 1 129 137