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BACHELARD *EN VACANCES*: THE SUBJECT OF SURREATIONALISM AND ITS FUNCTIONAL VALUE¹

ABSTRACT

This paper deals with the problem of the subject in Bachelard's concept of surreationalism. Focusing on the epistemological character of surreational creativity, the issue of the subject is approached through the analysis of the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity in the surreational act. Comparing the character of novelty in surrealism and surreationalism, the paper introduces Bachelard's distinction between formal and material imagination, with the latter further discussed through the prepositions "against" [*contre*] and "in" [*dans*]. Bachelard's theory of the internal dialectic – the theory of subdivision of the subject – is analyzed through his concept of *reverie*. The last chapter deals with the dialectic between the apodictic and the assertoric subject, aiming to reconsider the idea of interiority and *repose*.

KEYWORDS

Gaston Bachelard, surreationalism, the subject, subdivision of the subject, rational naivety, invention, epistemology, objectivity

1. Introduction

In the writings of Gaston Bachelard, there is little use of the word "vacation" [*vacances*]. One of those rare places to encounter it could be found in the first chapter of *L'eau et les rêves*. Dealing with "the objective conditions for narcissism"², Bachelard writes: "Real life becomes better if we give it its rightful *vacation* of unreality."³ Since he almost everywhere else uses the word "repose"

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2 This is the middle part of the chapter title "*Les eaux claires, les eaux printanières et les eaux courantes. Les conditions objectives du narcissisme. Les eaux amoureuses*". Bachelard 1942: 29.

3 *La vie réelle se porte mieux si on lui donne ses justes vacances d'irréalité*. Bachelard 1942: 35; emphasis added.

[*repos*] to name such a state of relaxation in reveries, one could ask whether the word choice has something to do here with the figure of Narcissus. Does not Narcissus repose? To find the answer, we should first take into account the attitude of the narcissist towards his countenance. On the one hand, he could admire his *real* image sighted on the water's surface. He would then want to preserve it by making no gestures. However, this real reflection could, on the other hand, inspire the narcissist to *idealize* the image he *sees*. Such idealization would soon make him want to *perfect* his image. Bachelard formulates this ambivalence as the narcissist dialectic between *seeing* [*voir*] and *showing oneself* [*se montrer*] (Bachelard 1942: 31). The self is thus endowed with being aware of its incompleteness. To love oneself in this way would be called "active", or better, "idealizing narcissism" (Bachelard 1942: 34), since it entails repeatedly going beyond one's real image. But it remains unclear whether this "going beyond" has a negative or positive value. Namely, under which sign does this iconoclastic act of the active narcissist relate to his own subject: *contre* or *dans*?⁴

When it comes to this problem of narcissistic self-rectification, it appears that the dialectic between these two prepositions – one relating to *extroversion* and the other to *introversion* – cannot be substituted with the dialectic between the "reveries of will" and "reveries of repose". And Bachelard's introduction of *vacances* could be considered a symptom of this problem.

2. The Misery of *Extra*

Regarding the concept of surrationalism, there were two reasons to begin with the figure of the dynamic narcissist. First, its dynamics are analogous to those of surrationalism. They reside in the subjective quality of the act of transcendence, implied by the prefix *sur-*. The second reason for employing the problem of active narcissism is related to the *paradox of the subject* which, unlike in the case of the surrationalist act, here becomes evident. But before explaining this in detail, I will outline the problem of objectivity and the "objective conditions" for surrationalism.

"The decisive action [*l'action décisive*] of reason [*raison*] is almost always confused with monotonous recourse [*recours*] to the certitudes of memory [*aux certitudes de la mémoire*]" (Bachelard 1936: 186; 1972c: 7). This sentence is situated at the beginning of Bachelard's essay "Le surrationalisme"⁵. After stating such misapprehension about reason, he introduces the concept of surrationalism, aiming to emphasize the need to redirect reason toward the "future of the mind". The futurism of this kind contrasts with the idea of recourse, or *return*. In Bachelard's view, what gives reason future is its inclination toward perpetual change. And the prefix *sur-* represents an operator of this change. It implies a

4 These two prepositions – 'against' [*contre*] and 'in' [*dans*] – epitomize Bachelard's two studies of earthen imagination – *reveries of will* and *reveries of repose* (Bachelard 1982: 2).

5 The essay "Le surrationalisme" was published in 1936 in the inaugural issue of *Inquisitions*, the periodical edited by Louis Aragon, Roger Caillois, Jules M. Monnerot, and Tristan Tzara (Chimisso 2013: 190).

specific alteration of rationalist thought. The need for an alteration suggests the task of the revolution of mind [*révolution spirituelle*] (Bachelard 1972c: 7). According to Bachelard, the surrealist revolution consists of two different actions:

By subtle endeavour reason must be brought to the point of not only doubting its own works, but also of systematically subdividing itself in all of its activities [*se diviser systématiquement dans chacune de ses activités*]. Briefly, human reason must be restored to its function of turbulent aggression [*il faut rendre à la raison humaine sa fonction de turbulence et d'agressivité*]. One contributes in this way to the founding of a *surrationalism* which will multiply the occasions for thought [*qui multipliera les occasions de penser*]. When this *surrationalism* will have established its doctrine, it can be allied with surrealism; both sensibility and reason will then mutually be restored to their fluidity [*fluidité*]. (Bachelard 1936:186; 1972c: 7; emphasis in original)

The analogy with surrealism could be traced along many lines. But probably the most significant one relates to the issue of *objectivity*. Breton writes his *Crise de l'objet* in the same year that the essay on *surrationalism* was published.⁶ Both the surreal and *surrational* thought, he states, go against commonsense reduction and seek an object which, “instead of being situated once for all below itself, is recreated beyond the limits of sight”⁷ (Breton 2002: 355). Bachelard explains the process of objectification in terms of determinism, based on the authority of first intuitions and their inherent geometrical simplification (Bachelard 1968: 80–81). What destabilizes the idea of the object is, therefore, the state of uncertainty, or indeterminism, in which the object is not deprived of those of its qualities that evade rational habits. In the citation from *Le nouvel esprit scientifique*, Breton underscores the idea of the indeterminate as the ‘hidden real’:

‘What, writes M. Bachelard, is belief in reality, what is the idea of reality, what is the primordial metaphysical function of the real? It is essentially the conviction that an entity exceeds its immediate datum, or, to put it more clearly, it is the conviction that (this is my emphasis) *more will be found in the hidden real* [réel caché] *than in the immediate datum*’. Such an affirmation is sufficient to justify in a brilliant way the surrealist approach aimed at provoking a total revolution of the object. (Breton 2002: 359; translated by the author)

At this point, I would say, all the analogies between the two “sur-philosophies” end. The similarity between surrealism and *surrationalism* was primarily found in the prefix *sur-*, which embodies the revolutionary forces directed against the conformist objectification. But it is in this very prefix that we find the difference between Breton and Bachelard. In fact, we may even be facing

6 Breton acknowledges the importance of Bachelard’s concept of *surrationalism* for the surrealist movement, stating that “each term serves to vindicate the other” (Breton 1968: 13).

7 “*au lieu de se situer une fois pour toutes en deçà d'elle-même, se recrée à perte de vue au delà*” (Breton 2002: 355). Translated by the author.

two different prefixes, two different prepositions, or, *positions* – positions toward what they call ‘the hidden real’. The possible difference is indicated by Breton’s expression “the revolution of the object”. It implies a strategy of de-objectification which seems to be radically different from that of surrealistism. To illustrate this problem, I will use Bachelard’s metaphor of fluidity, which seems suitable for expounding the divergence between these two approaches. In Breton, fluidity would represent openness in terms of overcoming the inclination toward retention. In other words, surrealist fluidity would mean *flux*. Surrealism de-objectifies as long as it produces *new objects*.⁸ These new objects are aimed at suppressing the objects’ *conventional* value in favor of the *representational* value, which makes the observer perceive them “more in terms of picturesqueness, of evocative capacity” (Breton 1968: 14).⁹ According to Bachelard, focusing on sensory values in this way gives rise only to *formal imagination*. He describes this type of imagination using the image of blooming flowers, since it arises from novelty and is constituted by “the picturesque, variety, the unexpected event [*du pittoresque, de la variété, de l’événement inattendu*]” (Bachelard 1942: 1). Unlike Breton, he sees this kind of exteriority as superficial. Being concentrated exclusively on sensory values [*les valeurs sensibles*], formal imagination does not give correspondences, but mere translations (Bachelard 1942: 31).

For Bachelard, the alternative to this simplifying formal imagination could be found in the realm of matter. His extensive writings on *material imagination* provide an approach to the issue of objectivity totally different from that of Breton’s. To use the metaphor of fluidity once again, the powers of material imagination to de-objectify could not be described in terms of flow, but *dissolution*. To dissolve a solid – that is, to take away its form – results in the

8 In *Crise de l’objet*, Breton enumerates the objects from the 1936 surrealist exhibition: *objets mathématiques, objets naturels, objets sauvages, objets trouvés, objets irrationnels, objets ready made, objets interprétés, objets incorporés, objets mobiles*. Speaking of these objects, he says they “are well conceived to break the spell that lies upon us – a spell imposed by objects that obtrude with numbing iteration on our senses every day and lure us into the belief that whatever might *exist* outside our senses must be an illusion” [*sont avant tout de nature à lever l’interdit résultant de la répétition accablante de ceux qui tombent journellement sous nos sens et nous engagent à tenir tout ce qui pourrait être en dehors d’eux pour illusoire*] (Breton 1968: 14; 2002: 358); emphasis in original.

9 Although not stated, this formulation is an obvious reference to Bachelard: “It is in science, perhaps, that one sees most clearly the two meanings of the ideal of objectivity, the social as well as the concrete value of objectification. [...] Faced with the most complex reality, we would, left to our own devices, seek knowledge of a picturesque kind, calling upon our evocative powers: *The world would be our representation*. If, on the other hand, we were entirely given over to society, we would seek knowledge in the realm of the general, the useful, the conventional: *The world would be our convention*. In fact, however, scientific truth is a prediction or, better still, a predication. By announcing the scientific truth we call for a meeting of minds; together we convey both an idea [*une pensée*] and an experience [*une expérience*], we link thought [*la pensée*] to experience [*l’expérience*] in an act of verification: *The scientific world is therefore that which we verify*” (Bachelard 1984: 11; 1972b: 11).

annulment of its objective values, due to the loss of determinacy found in perceptual precision. Additionally, in contrast to formal imagination and its inherent sensory values, matter gives rise to sensual values [*valeurs sensuelles*], which are reached by entering the “depths of being” (Bachelard 1942: 1). In this sense, object and form are categories concerned only with the *exteriority* of matter (Bachelard 1972a: 16). This *extra* of matter – that is, its outer quality – implies absolute suspension of the subject.¹⁰ In this sense, *extra* is the radical otherness. Being absolutely detached from the subject, *extra* is an attribute of the authentic real. Hence, we could say that *extra* is the end of surrealism. It is the horizon of the real which negates the idea of novelty. There is a possibility of *new* objects as long as surrealism does not come to its end – which is, the exteriority of matter, devoid of subjectivity. If surrealism succeeded in eliminating the subject, then the notions of objectivity and object would become obsolete. There would be no hidden real.

3. *L'intelligence est création*¹¹

In Bachelard, the hidden real has a rather different role, which is to dialectize rational thought instead of challenging one to aspire to radical exteriority. The complexity of this dialectical relation to the material as the outer could be discerned in the prepositions Bachelard uses for thematizing extrovert and introvert imagination – the prepositions *against* [*contre*] and *in* [*dans*]. The first thing we would notice is that they are not antonyms. They are different in kind. Unlike the latter, which is an entirely spatial determinant, *against* has both spatial and material value. “In” suggests a *position*, while “against” suggests an *opposition*, induced by the *resistance* of matter: “One wants to work matter, to transform it. A person then is no longer just a simple philosopher *before* the universe, but an indefatigable force *in opposition to* the universe, against the *substance* of matter itself” (Bachelard 2002: 22; emphasis in original). Only in experiencing opposition does one begin to understand “the engagement of subject and object” (Bachelard 2002: 60). And only within this dialectic could one think surreational novelty beyond the notion of *event*. In the case of surrealism, the hidden object – that is, the *unknown* – is itself the new. It is the new *discovered* by going beyond the objectifying structure of mind that makes the subject disengaged from seeing it. Because such a new arises regardless of the subject, it is a pure *event*. It is an *objet trouvé*. By contrast,

10 We could find traces of this problem in the meaning of the Latin *extrā*. Among many nuances in meaning, I will mention some which seem to best illustrate the relation to the problem of the subject. Used as an adverb, *extrā* could mean “without connexion with the matter in hand” (in rhetorics), or “away from one’s subject” (used with verbs of motion). As a preposition, it has the meaning of being outside as “beyond the scope of, not subject to; without relevance to, outside the field of; free from; not in accordance with”. Glare 2004, s.v. “*extrā*”.

11 This is the opening sentence of Jean Hyppolite’s essay “Gaston Bachelard ou le romantisme de l’intelligence” (Hyppolite 1954: 85).

the surrational novelty cannot be equated with the unknown. The unknown emerges here as an epistemological obstacle *directed against a specific rational structure*. This means that such an unknown “is not total. This unknown [*inconnu*] is not absolute. As total and absolute, it would cause the inactivity of the scientific thought. In fact, the unknown is ‘situated’ in front of it” (Bachelard 1972a: 25; translated by the author). As an epistemological obstacle, the unknown becomes *contre*, the opposition to a rational system which excludes it. The unknown is the hidden real which discloses the imperfection of a specific rational structure, the lack of its universality. It resists “the function of whichever [*quelconque*]”, which introduces the principle of identity – the principle of denying the “difference between objects of one class” (Bachelard 1972d: 30). The unknown thus provokes reason to rectify itself by *inventing* a new function of identity whereby what previously appeared as an exception now becomes explained. In this sense, the surrational invention is always total in its character. Being total means that it always carries in itself a new function, or a *new method*, upon which rationalism could experience a *new founding*. “So, paradoxically, what is new is fundamental” [*ce qui est nouveau est fondamentale*] (Bachelard 1972a: 7; translated by the author). The capability of “incessant founding” is the essence of reason, and the state of surrationalism is the prerequisite of such change. The *sur-* of surrationalism epitomizes its transcendental character and creative potential.

“*La raison travaillera contre elle-même*” (Bachelard 1966: 15). The preposition *contre* is transcendence itself. It represents the opposition to the function of *quelconque*, which proves to be wrong in front of an epistemological obstacle. In order to explain the cause of such incomprehensiveness, Bachelard introduces the notion of *axiom*. Axiomatic reduction, he says, originates from treating particular prepositions, which are often based on first experiences and common sense, as apodictic truths (Bachelard 1972d: 32). And this kind of reduction, which serves to overcome the differences between the rational and the real, represents objectification caused by limiting oneself exclusively to the formal imagination. The way to overcome this limitation is to reindividualize reason through the polemic of two different dialectics: the internal one, which belongs to reason, and the external one, which belongs to experience (Bachelard 1972c: 8). By the polemic of these two dialectics, reason will start to subdivide, thereby reaching the state of a specific *naivety*, where one freely puts basic axioms into question and starts playing with them: “*If, in any experience, one does not play with one’s reason, that experience is not worth while attempting*.” The risk of reason must, moreover, be total. It is its specific character to be total. All or nothing” (Bachelard 1972c: 11; emphasis in original; translated by the author). In this way, rational thought becomes active. Reason then enters the sphere of *imagination*, reaching the state of “rational naivety”. This is what Jean Hyppolite names the “romanticism of intelligence” of Gaston Bachelard, pointing out the ambivalence found in these expressions: “But this romanticism, this power that denies all limits to a creative imagination [...] is not in opposition with rationalism and all that this term implies of

earthly solidity and even of a mischievous and generous mistrust at the same time with regard to the possible impulses of mysticism.”¹²

4. The Unattainable *Intra*

How could ‘rational naivety’ not be an oxymoron? The ambiguity of this expression outlines Bachelard’s attempts to theorize the relationship between the surreational subject and imagination, which is given the key role in the act of surreationalist transcendence: “The imagination is not, as its etymology suggests, the faculty for forming images of reality; it is the faculty for forming images which exceed [*dépassent*] reality, which *sing* reality [*qui chantent la réalité*]” (Bachelard 1942: 23; translated by the author). The question is, how could this poetic excess be ordered epistemologically? That is, how could poetic imagination result in *invention* rather than the event, as is the case with surreal exteriority? Unlike the surrealist creation, which is characterized by the production of new objects beyond objectivity, surreationalism is, conversely, aimed at “objectless objectivity” (Poulet 1965: 5). The imagination, which makes it possible to reach objectivity beyond the objectified, does, as already said, require the existence of the subject. Here we face the *paradox of the subject*, which I have mentioned at the beginning in the context of active narcissism. Being the cause of objectifying (we could say formal) simplification, subjectivity is what should be opposed to in order to achieve objectivity. But at the same time, the presence of the subject is a prerequisite for objective thought. Having this in mind, ‘rational naivety’ would represent the elusive state between the desubjectivized subject and the subject of objectification, which Bachelard’s theory of reveries tries to grasp.

When talking about the reverie [*rêverie*], Bachelard opposes it to the dream [*rêve*]. The basic difference between these two states is related to whether the subject is present or not: “The night dreamer cannot articulate a *cogito*. The night dream is a dream without a dreamer. On the contrary, the dreamer of reverie remains conscious enough to say: it is I who dream the reverie” (Bachelard 1969: 22). “Remains conscious enough to [...]” implies that reveries can vary in degree. For that reason, reverie and dream are not opposite concepts. Reverie is a state between two extremes – dream and the state of full attention. As completely deprived of the *cogito*, nocturnal dreams embody the idea of Nothingness¹³ (Bachelard 1969: 146). Reverie is, therefore, the state of the subject

12 “*Mais ce romantisme, cette puissance déniait toute limite à une imagination créatrice [...] n’est pas en opposition avec le rationalisme et tout ce que ce terme implique de solidité terrienne et même de défiance malicieuse et généreuse à la fois à l’égard des entraînements possibles du mysticisme*” (Hyppolite 1954: 85). Translated by the author.

13 The idea of Nothingness could be implied in the disappearance of the function of *quelconque* in the nocturnal dream. “Night grammar is not the same as the grammar of the day. In the night dream, the function of the *whatever* does not exist. There is no ordinary dream; there are no ordinary oneiric images. All the adjectives in a nocturnal dream are qualifiers. The philosopher who believes he can include the dream in thought

exposing itself to the dialectics between its being and the nothingness of its being. But there is another distinction between dream and reverie suggested by Bachelard. Namely, he assumes a gender difference between dream and reverie, where the former has a masculine character and the latter feminine.¹⁴ Reverie means inaction: “Reverie without drama, without event or history gives us true repose, the repose of the feminine. There we gain gentleness of living. Gentleness, slowness, peace [...]” (Bachelard 1969: 19). By contrast, the dream has dynamic quality, it is characterized by “incessant movement.”¹⁵ The nocturnal dynamics, however, could not be equated with those in the daytime, since they are not conditioned by will. We have then two different types of action. But which one really bears the sign of the masculine? To be more specific, how could the undirected activity – the activity beyond the preposition *contre* – of the night dream be masculine? Bachelard justifies his thesis by referring to the material–formal distinction:

The man of reverie is always in space which has volume. Truly inhabiting the whole volume of his space, the man of reverie is from anywhere *in [dans]* his world, in an *inside [dedans]* which has no *outside [dehors]*. It is not without reason that people commonly say that the dreamer is *plunged* in his reverie. The world no longer poses any opposition to him [*Le monde ne lui fait plus vis-à-vis*]. The I no longer opposes itself to the world. In reverie there is no more non-I. In reverie, the *no* no longer has any function: everything is welcome.

A philosopher enamored of the history of philosophy could say that the space in which the dreamer is plunged is a “plastic mediator” between man and the universe. It seems that in the intermediary world where reverie and reality mingle, a plasticity of man and his world is realized [...]. Contrary to reverie, the nocturnal dream hardly knows this soft plasticity. Its space is encumbered with solids—and solids always have a reserve of sure hostility. They keep their forms and when a form appears, it is necessary to *think*, it is necessary to name. In the nocturnal dream, the dreamer suffers from a hard geometry. (Bachelard 1969: 167; 1968: 144–145)

Beyond the idea of the androgynous, it becomes difficult to understand the relationship between involution and plasticity. The phenomenology of the plastic would necessarily break the sphere of absolute interiority by dynamizing the

would have a great deal of difficulty, while remaining in the world of dream, passing, as he does so easily in his lucid meditations, from the *whatever [quelconque]* to the *someone [quelqu'un]*” (Bachelard 1969: 148–149; 1968: 127).

¹⁴ Bachelard derives this assumption from the difference in grammatical gender between *le rêve* and *la rêverie*: “Dreams (*rêve*, m.) and reveries (*rêverie*, f.), dreams (*songe*, m.) and daydreams (*songerie*, f.), memories (*souvenir*, m.) and remembrance (*souvenance*, f.) are all indications of a need to make everything feminine which is enveloping and soft above and beyond the too simply masculine designations for our states of mind” (Bachelard 1969: 29).

¹⁵ “*Dans quel espace vivent nos rêves? Quel est le dynamisme de notre vie nocturne? L'espace de notre sommeil est-il vraiment un espace de repos? N'a-t-il pas plutôt un mouvement incessant et confus?*” (Bachelard 1970: 195).

subject of repose. If there is a “plastic mediator” between the enfolded subject and the universe, then this subject will transpose the volume inside which it is located. It will internalize the *dans*. It will divide itself into the “masculine” and the “feminine”, the active and the passive. It will restore the dialectical function *inside* itself. This subdivision of the subject is what Bachelard considers a condition of the “poetic reverie”. The poetic reverie arises from the internal dialectic of the two I’s¹⁶, by which it is transformed into a “positive reverie, a reverie which produces, a reverie which, however weak its product, can well be named poetic reverie. In its products and in its producer, reverie can well take on the etymological sense of the word “poetic”. Reverie assembles being around its dreamer. It gives him illusions of being more than he is. Thus, upon this less-than-being (*moins-être*) which is the relaxed state where the reverie takes form, there emerges an outline in relief—a relief which the poet will know how to swell into a more-than-being [*plus-être*]

 (Bachelard 1969: 152; 1968: 131).

5. The Idea of *Dehors*

“Real life becomes better if we give it its rightful *vacation* of unreality”. The function of unreality is “the function which dynamizes the psychism”, unlike the function of the real which inhibits it (Hyppolite 1954: 94). The element of unreality is fiction, the fictional thought [*pensée fictive*], which leads the subject to subdivision (Bachelard 1966: 67). In the state of the subdivided subject, one enters the realm of the internal dialectic – between existence and surexistence, control and supposition, the apodictic subject and the assertoric subject, reduction and ideationism¹⁷, the *sujet valorisant* and the *sujet valorisée* (Bachelard 1966: 60–67; 1972c: 28). Or, in Derridian terms, the dialectic between the *constative* and the *performative*:

The infinitely rapid oscillation between the performative and the constative, between language and metalanguage, fiction and nonfiction, autoreference and heteroreference, and so on, does not just produce an essential instability. This instability constitutes that very event—let us say, the work [*l’œuvre*—whose invention normally disturbs, as it were, the norms, the statutes, and the rules. It calls for a new theory and for the constitution of new statutes and conventions that, capable of recording the possibility of such events, would be able to account for them. (Derrida 2007: 13)

16 In *Le rationalisme appliqué* Bachelard proposes this idea of the division of the subject into the *subject of existence* and the *subject of surexistence*. These two subjects coexist in the form of a *cogitamus* (Bachelard 1966: 60).

17 Bachelard introduces the dialectic between reduction and ideationism in the essay “La psychologie de la raison”. He names this dialectic the *psychologized logic* [*logique psychologisée*], which he considers inherent in the new scientific spirit. He describes reduction as the “pure logic” [*logique pure*], and ideationism as “mathematizing logic” [*logique mathématisante*]. “These functions are the systole and the diastole which have to endlessly follow one another if we want the reason to have, as it should, an action of surveillance and an action of invention, a defensive action and an offensive action” (Bachelard 1972d: 28–29); translated by the author.

The figure of the active narcissist – who repeatedly, in “the infinitely rapid oscillation”, invents and structures his self – becomes the paradigm of “the inventive event”, “the quotation and the narrative” (Derrida 2007: 12). These ceaseless shifts are experienced as simultaneity, resulting in all the oppositions between extroversion and introversion being destabilized. In front of his image in the mirror, the narcissist indulges in both the formal and material imagination: he watches himself touching his own body. The matter of his body becomes the object of his dreams about perfect plasticity. He thus experiences a twofold immediacy. But there could be no repose. The idea of enfolding oneself is negated here by inverting the very idea of interiority. With the image of Narcissus standing in front of the mirror, the acts of extroversion and introversion take different directions. Will is not more pointed toward the world, but the self. However, it retains the quality of *contre*. On the other hand, the narcissist’s subject of surexistence negates the idea of repose, of pause. Any cessation and, consequently, any possibility of a *return* to the “subject of existence”, becomes impossible in front of the perpetual self-centered action. If the narcissist’s interiority is being turned outwards, then one might ask whether the preposition *dans* should be replaced with its opposite, *dehors*? If yes, what would provide relaxation of being, required to reach the poetic state of *moins-être*? As opposed to any recollection, would it be an act of *vacation*¹⁸?

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18 lat. *uacāre* (v.) “(of a space, surface, etc.) to be vacant, empty, or unfilled; (of places) to be without inmates or occupants; to be destitute or devoid (of), free (from).” Glare 2004, s.v. “*uacō*.”

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Bašlar *en vacances*: subjekt nadržacionalizma i njegova funkcionalna vrednost

Apstrakt

Rad se bavi problemom subjekta unutar Bašlarovog koncepta nadržacionalizma. Fokusirajući se na epistemološki karakter nadržacionalne kreativnosti, pitanju subjekta se pristupa kroz analizu odnosa subjektivnosti i objektivnosti u činu nadržacionalizma. Sa ciljem poređenja karaktera novog u nadrealizmu i nadržacionalizmu, pristupljeno je analizi Bašlarove distinkcije između formalne i materijalne imaginacije, čiji se dijalektički karakter dalje razmatra kroz predloge „protiv“ [*contre*] i „u“ [*dans*]. Takođe, Bašlarova teorija unutrašnje dijalektike – teorija podele subjekta – analizira se kroz njegov koncept *sanjarije*. U poslednjem poglavlju se ovaj problem analizira unutar dijalektike između apodiktičkog i asertoričkog subjekta, sa namerom da se preispita ideja unutrašnjosti i *počinka*.

Ključne reči: Gaston Bašlar, nadržacionalizam, subjekt, podela subjekta, racionalna naivnost, invencija, epistemologija, objektivnost